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CONCLUSION
Monroe E. Price

We have tried in this volume to capture some of the complexi
ties of applying comparative models in the media law reform con
text. What arises from our study is an interesting duality. On the
one hand, country-specific statutes must be understood in terms of
exphcit and implicit global and regional linkages — such as the EU
and the World Trade Organization — which serve as modifiers to
individual state action. Regulation no longer stands in national iso
lation; like technology, it becomes increasingly interlocked with
much of what occurs elsewhere in the world. On the other hand, so
much about every statutory modification is unique to its own cul
ture, reflecting the particular and traditional roles of the nation in
which it arises, that comparisons are difficult to make. Language
itself — the very words that are the currency of media discourse —
reflects this duality. Terms that look the same have radically differ
ent meanings depending, in part, on the locus of each society in the
media transformation so characteristic of late twentieth century
life. For these reasons, the volume focuses both on traditions and
history within India but, at the same time, tries to place the Indian
debate in a global context.
In bringing together the segments of this book, one thing, and
perhaps only one thing, is clear: there is no other place in the world
with India's special history and special cultural needs. There are
very few places that have had the sudden and generally unregu
lated liberalization in cable and satellite that is characteristic of In
dia since 1990. There me very few places that are as conscious of
the need for sensitivity with respect to programming that can be
divisive to the point of violence. And, still, there are very few
places that have so sophisticated a reservoir of talent in the rapidly
burgeoning information technology sector. Few places have had to
work out in so complex a fashion the complementary role of the
center and the regions in terms of broadcasting and cultural policy.
The move to private broadcasting rarely has so neatly coincided
with the shift of the central broadcaster, moving in the language of
the discipline from a state entity to a public service provider under
the auspices of an independent authority. There are, indeed, few
places that are becoming so fully integrated into the world political
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and economic discourse. These are all characteristics of India but,
together, of nowhere else. As a result, India is incomparable, a se
vere problem in a book about comparability.
The essays in this volume show, too, that the process of draft
ing broadcasting legislative reform is — worldwide — one of the
most important legal phenomena of our time. Societies every
where are — or have been — intensely reexamining the role of the
state and the power of law in a time of media globalization. In the
last decade, broadcasting laws have changed for two major reasons.
In some countries, as in the former Soviet Union, change has been
a result of major internal political transformations that redefine the
role of the state. In other countries, primarily in the West, change
is mandated because shifts in technology have implications for the
economic assumptions of the existing regulatory regimes. In many
places — and India is certainly one of them — the revision of
broadcasting laws brings together concern about new technology at
the very same time as the process of defining the nation itself con
tinues to evolve. This process of reinventing broadcast regulation
is not an easy one. Europe, after a decade, is still amplifying and
clarifying its "Television Without Frontiers" Directive. Russia,
years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, has not been able to
reconcile itself to new legislation. The US is, with difficulty, di
gesting the massive and complex Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Taiwan, Australia, Canada, Korea, the UK, and many others are,
have been, or are planning extensive changes to their broadcast
regime. The search for the proper tools of regulation is a world
wide phenomenon.
In this context, comparative media law can help on the theo
retical and practical level. Comparative law is an aid in compre
hending the underlying dialectics, the themes that are beneath the
surface, the kinds of economic and social plays that characterize
media law reform in a wide variety of settings. Comparative law
allows us to see change in the large, great divisions of approaches,
including those that are typical of democratic societies and those
that are not. Comparative law is practical as well; it deals with the
mechanics of the language of licensing or of establishing regulatory
authorities and tests the language of program content control.
For all decision makers in every state engaged in media re
form, a key question is which guiding rule is chosen, which rule of
emphasis among competing goals. The adoption of such a principle
becomes an internal signal that indicates how various potentially
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conflicting goals can be simultaneously achieved or sorted out. A
guiding rule indicates whether economic development is the pre
vailing theme, or cultural preservation, or acculturation and ab
sorption within a world economy. Of course, in most contexts, the
signals sent out incorporate several of these objectives.
The documents surrounding the Broadcasting Bill — as we
have tried to show — indicated something of the guiding rule for
the future course of the law. The Ministry's Issues and Perspectives
note made the very valuable point that, in designing the Broadcast
ing Bill, "we ha[d] to look for a suitable model [for legislation]
among the democratic countries," fairly much rejecting "the other
option of licensing and regulating each and every individual dish
antenna" because such an approach is "neither desirable nor
feasible."^
By opting for the "democratic countries" as a model a guiding
rule is implicitly selected. For what is characteristically distinctive
about these "democratic countries," in fact, is how they articulate
the strategy of achieving goals, how they navigate among compet
ing goals, and how they balance interests important to the society.
By choosing to look at the "democratic countries," the drafters
seemed to be selecting more than form, more than the words of the
draft. Imbedded in the regulatory choices of the Western models is
a recognition that consumer choice must be given great weight and
that diversity and plurality of voices, including non-governmental
voices and voices from abroad, should be recognized as making a
significant contribution to an emerging national identity and vision.
Each of these societies must choose how to balance the various
goals, though in each of them there seems to be deep-seated reser
vations about excessive state control and undue state intervention
in economic planning.
The Ministry note was even more precise as to which of the
models from abroad were most relevant and helpful in the forma
tion of the Indian Broadcasting Bill. Among the options, as was
indicated earlier in this volume, the US and German models were
found less relevant, the former, perhaps, because of over-reliance
on the private sector and the latter because of over-reliance, histor
ically, on the state. The drafters turned, especially, to the model of
the UK which has "much more elaborate and detailed rules and
1 MINISTRY OF INFO, AND BROAD., BROADCASTING BILL: ISSUES AND PERSPEcnvEs 2

(1996) [hereinafter ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES].
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regulations on ... broadcasting, which have been tried and tested
for the last 6 to 7 years.
Thus, the note concludes that "[t]he
basic framework of our proposed broadcasting bill is, therefore,
based on the UK law."^ The Minister similarly recognized in many
of his public statements that India is and must be part of the global
marketplace of imagery and that the regulatory regime must take
this into account.
The objectives of the UK, however listed, cannot be fully un
derstood without fathoming the way in which national identity con
cerns are harmonized with the encouragement of consumer choice
and open entry. Broadcasting, long one of the instruments of es
tablishing national identity, under a BBC monopoly is now one of
the most liberal of institutions in terms of entry and one where
restrictions on ownership are being progressively diminished. The
UK is not only a good model for specific provisions, it is a good
model for the balance among provisions as well.
Just as important, the UK regulatory framework cannot be un
derstood without the perspective of Europe and its institutions
(i.e., the Commission, the Parliament and the Courts). Broadcast
ing regulation in any of the member states must be interpreted
against the struggle for European identity, European information
space, and a European regulatory framework. This part of the UK
model is important for India because there are surprising similari
ties and lessons. First, in Europe as well as here there is the ten
sion between unity and diversity. The European Commission is
seeking a regulatory pattern that fosters European unity; as well,
one of the historic purposes of broadcasting policy in India has
been to contribute to national unity. Certainly, aspects of the cur
rent bill are designed to do that. At the same time, in Europe, as
here, broadcasting policy is increasingly about recognizing diver
sity, especially cultural diversity, and preserving and strengthening
languages through the recognition of regional voices.
European regulation — as is true of the proposed Broadcast
ing Bill — also involves the difficult relationship between broad
casting as commodity and broadcasting as an essential element of
formation of culture. There is no question — in Europe and else
where — that broadcasting is classified as a service governed by
the rules of trade within the Union. Television programming is
2 Id.
3 Id.
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subject to the Treaty of Rome and prohibitions on impediments to
trade among the member states. On the other hand, the cultural
face of television programming is present in the EU's toleration of
country-based content standards, licensing of terrestrial broadcast
ers, and other techniques related to the growing importance of this
form of visual imagery.
The European experience is also vital — as a means of devel
oping a European Information Space — because of the shift from
"negative regulation" to "positive incentives," from a focus on re
strictions and quotas to affirmative efforts to create a European
voice including the assemblage of existing national voices. The Eu
ropean case is interesting because it tolerates — perhaps requires
— the unimpeded, unregulated locus of Luxembourg while simul
taneously embracing the far more articulated regulation within
each state. Satellite, especially satellite to home, can find a zone
that encourages experimentation and freedom from regulation at
the same time that terrestrial broadcasting merely evolves from its
previous regulatory forms.
Of course, it is interesting, too, in terms of the comparison be
tween Europe and India to consider the tension between unity and
diversity, llie Broadcasting Bill could be seen as a restructuring of
broadcasting policy, shifting from an emphasis on unity to a recog
nition of diversity, while Europe is shifting from the diversity of
national systems to an effort to create a unifying European space.
The public broadcast map in India has been divided into both the
national network and the regional, which permitted the Indian
Government to have a hold on the nation while enabling the state
governments to broadcast regional cultural, political, and social
events in the major regional language. This hardly captures the
complexity of either the Indian or European context on this ques
tion of unity and diversity. Another comparative note is that in
Europe broadcasting has not been perceived so much as a develop
mental tool as it has been in India, while in both contexts broad
casting has been an educational tool, an instrument of state culture.
I.

GLOBALISM AND CULTURAL INVASION

We turn, finally, to a few specific goals and objectives and try
to provide some comparative perspectives on issues that were cen
tral to the Broadcasting Bill. One of the most difficult parts of the
Bill involved what might be called "foreignness," the need for tech
niques, according to the Ministry note, that would "thwart the in-
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vasion from foreign satellite broadcasters,'"* or, to quote another
comment, that would reduce "[t]he adverse impact of these TV
programmes on the Indian values and culture...
Of course, the
elimination of foreign programming, or even foreign values, is not
a goal or objective of the Bill. The relevant objective or goal is
"preserving national identity," to put it positively.
A review of the global debate and global developments casts
light on the refiguring of the terms of discourse concerning what is
often called "cultural invasion." Increasingly, each private pro
ducer of programming, and public service programmer as well,
wants to be a participant in the global or regional distribution sys
tem as well as the domestic one. The line between "foreign," trans
national, and domestic is eroding, and certainly it is eroding as an
indicator of programming strategy. Furthermore, the World Trade
Organization impetus — which is clearly a direction though not yet
a universal tendency — is to redefine lines so that decisions about
the right to participate in a market do not turn on the country of
origin of the potential programmer or provider. For historic and
security reasons, this is not true of terrestrial broadcasting, but it is
increasingly, though not always, the case with the new satellite
technology.
Examining recent changes in communications policy in Eu
rope, in the UK and elsewhere, it is clear that increasingly there
are more positive and dynamic aspects of globalism. The aim is for
a future in which there can be a global discourse with regional ef
forts specifically seeking to be represented. The BBC is an example
of an entity which has moved from a defined and historic domestic
function to an ambitious and potentially commercially supportable
global function. The Tirkish Government has encouraged its pub
lic and private broadcasters to become active in Central Asia and
to provide programming to the Turkish worker diaspora in Europe.
MBC, the satellite service originating in the Middle East, has a sim
ilar cultural, political, and commercial set of goals. The recent
Green Paper published in Ireland stated in paragraph 15.2 that
"[i]n the new international broadcasting environment it is probable
that public service broadcasting . . . must, in order to survive, no

4 Id.
5 MINISTRY OF INFO, AND BROAD., SUBJECT: BROADCASTING LAW FOR INDIA 1
(1997).
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longer rely purely on a national strategy."® The Green Paper in
paragraph 15.7 then asked this tantalizing question: "[I]s there a
need in the current environment to consider whether there should
be a framework to cater for the establishment and transmission of
broadcasting services from Ireland on a purely commercial basis
7'>7
Increasingly, the question may be how does one harness the
energy of the new multi-channel, transnational universe to pursue
global — as well as domestic — cultural and political goals. For
India, as for the UK, great opportunities exist in this redefinition of
the global set of images. Reliance on the line between "foreign"
and domestic entrants becomes less and less likely the greater the
country becomes an exporter of information. The private sector in
television programming in India is still at its early stages, but it has
grown with great rapidity. That sector, and those involved in build
ing distribution, will be seeking alliances, including additional mar
kets outside of India. The accomplishments of the Indian economy
in the computer hardware and software field will have their coun
terparts in the entertainment and cultural areas of programming.
In this way, the categories of "foreign" and "domestic" will give
way to new ones governed more by trade than by borders.
This is a time when Hollywood studios are owned by Japanese
and other foreign corporations and the major American exporter
of programming could be characterized as Australian. Europe's
television is unique because of the multiplicity of sources available
to an increasing number of individuals: it is the fact that German,
British, and French television are available that makes it European.
The search for an audience forces a Europeanization of NBC and
CNN, not the other way around. The same may be true for India.
The ironies and contradictions between a policy of encouraging ex
ports and becoming part of a world of borderless economic alli
ances, but regulating imports, becomes too apparent and, in a time
of increasing reciprocity, too limiting.
Another aspect of the debate is that it is becoming increas
ingly clear that ownership restrictions have less impact on content
than might have been predicted or hoped and merely are often
mechanisms designed to protect local competitors without major
® Green Paper on Broadcasting (visited Dec. 4, 1997) <http://wwwavc.ucd.ie/gpdata/

green_paper>.
7 Id.
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cultural consequences. In a competitive multi-channel environ
ment, no individual channel wants to be hamstrung in its efforts to
secure the largest or most profitable audience. In the necessarily
open environment that now exists, the task of thinking about infor
mation space and its substantive content is a far more complex one
than ever before. For this reason too, legislation which focuses on
limiting foreign ownership can be self-deceptive if it is a tool for
influencing content.
This volume stands for the proposition that what is important
in evaluating comparative approaches to broadcast regulation is
the balance among competing priorities. The UK, indeed all of the
countries with a verbal allegiance to the "free market," take into
account national interest and cultural considerations in fashioning
their domestic regulatory pattern. But the question is not whether
all countries are sensitive to their national identity needs. It is,
rather, the balance, the combination of restrictions and immunities
that makes up the package of regulations. Article 10 of the Coun
cil of Europe's Convention on Transfrontier Television flexibly
provides that the majority of transmission time — not including
sports, news, game shows and the like — should be of "European
works."® Canada carefully determines which satellite services are
eligible for carriage on direct broadcast satellites directed at its
population so as to provide encouragement for domestic counter
parts. Of course, there are these tools for addressing national iden
tity. But the tools exist in a context of competition, increasingly
free entry and a maximization of consumer choice.
Besides, especially in Europe, while it is important that na
tional economic and cultural interests be protected, the method of
doing so seems to be changing in ways that reflect the increasingly
regional and transregional distribution of signals. The studies in
this book indicate how in Europe there is both a greater zeal for a
European Information Space and a relaxation of quota require
ments. The search is for mechanisms that will affirmatively be ef
fective in terms of serving the regional culture as opposed to
mechanical and seemingly unproductive efforts.
In all the European member states, the role of the public ser
vice broadcaster has been redefined in terms of protecting plural
ism. As the Ministry note stated: public service broadcasting must
® European Convention on Transfrontier Television, May 5, 1989, art. 10(1), Europ.
T.S. No. 132.
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be a "catalyst for social change and national development. In or
der to achieve this objective and with a view to meet the informa
tion, education and entertainment need of the general masses, it is
necessary that a country must have a strong public service broad
casting."^ This truth, so clearly articulated here, suggests how im
portant public service broadcasting becomes in the new multi
channel universe. That is the experience in Europe, and it should
be the experience in India as well.
II.

CROSS-MEDIA RESTRICTIONS AND PLURALISM

The Indian Broadcasting Bill was designed to increase plural
ism and diversity, and ownership restrictions of broadcast service
licenses were a major tool for accomplishing that objective.
Throughout the world, however, economists and others question
why standard antitrust approaches are not used to regulate concen
tration in the media field. It is often said that special rules are
adopted to regulate competition in the media field either because
of (a) the scarcity of frequencies or (b) the critical role of speech
and culture in the society. But both these arguments are being
refigured in the current architecture of broadcast regulation.
Neither is abandoned. New modes, however, are being established
to meet these concerns.
One basis for departing from special rules is that the scarcity
argument is becoming less and less powerful. In the US, particu
larly, there is almost a sense of scorn for those who contend for
special regulation of broadcasting on the basis of scarcity of chan
nels. The departure of "scarcity" as an argument means, however,
that legislative attempts should be measured by whether they in
crease diversity. Cross-media ownership rules which make plural
ism and diversity harder to achieve are counterproductive and
should not be imposed.
As a result, what might be called "mechanical" or automatic
cross-media or ownership restrictions — of the kind included in the
Broadcasting Bill — are being eliminated in the UK, throughout
Europe and elsewhere in favor of newer tests for effective determi
nation of dominance. These include "share of audience" tests or
tests in which cross-ownership depends on the mix and impact of
the combination rather than the categorical limitation on one area
of the media to another. In Germany, for example, no media com® ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 2-3.

550

CARDOZO J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW

[Vol. 5:541

pany can gain more than a 30% share of annual viewership. A
lower measure is used for information-related programs. In Italy,
for instance, no owner of a national television channel can also
control a newspaper that has more than 16% of the national daily
circulation. In the UK, numerical limits on the holding of televi
sion licenses have been abolished as have rules limiting the com
mon control of terrestrial, satellite and cable television
broadcasters. Instead, there are measures of dominance — as, for
example, 15% of the national audience — and increased attention
from the general competition regulators.
Second (again reflecting the UK and Australia approach), for
those categories of media that are considered "less influential"
than others, the basis for special restrictions on ownership are also
reduced. The reflection of this principle in the Broadcasting Bill
might be constructed as follows: terrestrial broadcasting should re
main regulated as to ownership because it reflects scarce frequen
cies and it plays a highly critical role in terms of culture and
society. DTH functions in an environment that is far less vital to
the formation of the political sense of nationhood. This is a func
tion of cost of subscriber access, levels of penetration, and the na
ture of programming carried on the DTH platform. The point is
that many of the newer broadcasting legislative initiatives recog
nize that diversity and pluralism can be defeated rather than fur
thered by cross-media prohibitions that are unnecessarily
restrictive. The introduction of new capital-intensive technology
can be thwarted by limiting or prohibiting the incentives for poten
tial entrants. Many countries have cross-media ownership restric
tions; these, however, seemed somewhat accentuated in the
categorical and multi-layered restrictions characteristic of the
Broadcasting Bill.
The studies in this volume also show how useful it is to ex
amine the substantive limitations and procedural practices under
the ICCPR and the European Convention. Parallels between deci
sions of the High Court in India and similar decisions elsewhere
should also be especially noted. For example, there has been a
great deal of attention, in various contexts, to the discretion of the
DTH satellite operator in selecting many or all of the broadcast
services that are delivered to the home. The more the restrictions
on carriage (for example, the extent to which existing national
broadcasters are required to be carried), the less the onus on crossmedia restrictions.
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In this regard, the European experience with media concentra
tion rules and cultural protection measures are of particular rele
vance to India's proposed legislation. In constructing the freedom
of expression guarantees in article 19 of the Indian Constitution,
the Indian Supreme Court has at least twice taken into account
article 10 of the European Convention and the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights. Moreover, the case law of the
EU's competition rules implicates the exercise of rights guaranteed
under article 10, which the ECJ has recognized as one of the funda
mental rights protected in the EU's legal order.
This is not to say that European law negates all attempts to
regulate media ownership or impose measures of cultural protec
tionism. It is, however, recognition of the fact that European
courts and lawmakers have acknowledged the complexity of these
issues and the duty imposed on states to justify their policies in
these areas — similar to the burden imposed on the state by the
Indian Supreme Court in article 19 cases. In particular, in the Eu
ropean experience these requirements have been subject to partic
ular scrutiny when they have entailed the denial of national
treatment to foreign media entities.
Here again, India's goals and dilemmas are shared by those of
many other countries; how India realizes them will be important
not only internally, and not only as a model for other countries of
the region, but also as an integrated part of an international whole.
Because of the growing international flow of information, each
state's restrictions become a matter of interest and relevance for
other states. A fundamental question is whether the proper line to
draw is foreign/domestic ownership, or, rather, a line that is related
to the pluralistic mix of services or content carried on the satellite.
Related questions are whether regulation should turn on whether
an Indian satellite is used, and whether uplinks should be allowed
only from India. Ostensibly, reasonable content restrictions might
render additional constraints more harmful than beneflcial.
III.

RETROACTIVITY

While the Broadcasting Bill sought to bring a new order to the
new technological environment, it recognized, in some instances,
the need to respect existing investments. Transitions are honored
for existing cable systems while the licensing process takes shape.
And there are provisional opportunities for non-licensed satellite
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broadcasting services to be carried so that present programming
strategies can be maintained.
There was, however, some concern expressed about the
Broadcasting Bill's possible retroactivity effect, where proposed re
strictions undermine substantial investments made in Indian com
munications ventures under the preexisting legal regime. With
respect to bilateral and multilateral relations between India and
other nations, this retroactive restriction poses serious legal ques
tions. In general, a dramatic retroactive limitation on ownership
and investment that is inconsistent with the currently existing
worldwide pattern and practice of encouraging foreign investment
in the communications and media spheres would merit great
scrutiny.
The question of retroactivity of foreign investment restrictions
is quite independent of the question of whether such restrictions
(and similar restrictions on ownership) are themselves justifiable
and consistent with world trends. Indeed, the foreign investment
restriction issues of the Broadcasting Bill are being examined
worldwide. There are currently many patterns of prospective re
strictions on foreign investment, sometimes differentiating invest
ment from ownership, sometimes differing between carriers and
programmers, sometimes differing based on technology. In this
volume, there has not been sufficient opportunity to explore fully
these questions on the relationship of regulation to investment or
the impact of multilateral and bilateral agreements.
IV.

UPLINKING AND LICENSING

Our comparative study suggests the interrelatedness of provi
sions of the Broadcasting Bill — or any media legislation. For ex
ample, the content-related aspects of the Broadcasting Bill
reflected important public, religious, and historical needs. But, in
light of these provisions, the question might have been asked
whether the combination of techniques used to achieve these goals
is productive, especially the domestic uplinking requirement.
Uplinking requirements can be a transmission counterpart to li
censing satellite dishes and receivers. If all programming suppliers
conform to the content requirements, then an external uplinking
prohibition is not necessary. If the requirement for uplinking is to
favor a domestic economic supplier, then other bilateral trade arrangements are at risk. It is worth examining whether the particu
lar nature of the statute's cumulative aspects of content standards.
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licensing requirements, and foreign ownership requirements pro
vide a coherent, effective way for India to realize its objectives.
None of the democratic societies cited by the various Ministry
notes have an exclusive uplinking requirement. It is true that any
analysis in India or about India must be responsive to the particu
lar complexities of the Indian broadcasting landscape, including the
mosaic of Indian culture, linguistic needs, and the system of na
tional and regional broadcasting and its relationship to the political
system. The Indian Government is appropriately concerned about
strengthening and encouraging Indian culture and requiring the
carriage of Indian channels. But it should be some cause of con
cern if the predominant practice, especially in societies that India
respects, is at odds with the provisions of the Broadcasting Bill.
V.

OBJECTIVES OF MODERN BROADCASTING LEGISLATION

The objectives of broadcasting legislation sometimes get lost
in the technicalities of drafting and the competition among interest
groups. We must remember, however, why the process is so rivet
ing: these statutes are not only about competing economic inter
ests, but are about communications and culture, sovereignty and
development. These are issues that — in their relationship to tech
nologies of speech — have never seemed so immediate, so press
ing, and so difficult to define and adjust. At the moment, in fact,
the very capacity of law to effect massive changes in communica
tions technology seems, sometimes, to be in doubt.
One need go no further than the Ministry note that was issued
in relation to the Bill for an understanding of this society's goals.
The note echos concerns that are articulated in many countries,
and they are presented, slightly restated, here:
(a) Preserving national identity and giving direction and shape
to the national vision;
(b) Encouraging local and regional aspirations and needs;
(c) Assuring plurality of news and views;
(d) Recognizing and fulfilling the need for private
broadcasting;
(e) Sustaining and developing voices and production talent
that can compete effectively in a global marketplace of
programming;
(f) Avoiding monopolies in broadcast ownership and sources
of information; and
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(g) Making efficient uses of the airwaves in the public interest.
In addition, there are objectives not so frequently articulated
here as in the West, but nonetheless recognized as necessary conse
quences of broadcasting reforms:
(a) Expanding the economy;
(b) Enhancing the information infrastructure through job cre
ation and new business development; and
(c) Increasing consumer choice.
More significant than listing objectives is determining the
comparative emphasis among them. Explicitly or not, when provi
sions from foreign models are imported and collected for a new
synthesis, as in the Broadcasting Bill, there is a danger that the
relationship between those provisions and others that surround
them will be abandoned. Various formulae for emphasis and pri
oritization can be conceived and have been in various national con
texts. For example, a guiding rule might be to design a statute
which tailors the task of maintaining identity and plurality so as to
encourage, simultaneously, the maximum positive impact on the
economy. A somewhat different formula would be to maximize
consumer choice while protecting and guarding community needs.
Some societies — and they are often referred to as "the closed so
cieties" — claim to maximize national identity while, in fact, maxi
mizing political control.
VI.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND THE
BROADCASTING BILL

In this volume, we have sought to address how significant
goals reflected in the Broadcasting Bill relate to similar goals in
other broadcasting reform initiatives, particularly in Europe. We
have tried to discuss, in greater particularity, certain of those objec
tives, including preserving and strengthening national identity and
encouraging a plurality of voices. We have indicated that in the
democratic societies that have served as models for India, these
goals are melded with concerns about the growth of the economy
and the dignity of consumer choice. This volume is, however, only
a beginning in this process. In India, the debate shifts from a dis
cussion on a broadcasting bill to a discussion of a broadcasting law,
as well as to the substantial changes in the structure of Doordarshan as a result of Prasar Bharati. So, in every country, the debate
shifts as well: sometimes as a result of technology, sometimes as a

1997]

CONCLUSION

555

result of changing attitudes toward competition or the appropriate
infrastructure for the media.
In the family of changes in media laws around the world, the
Indian Broadcasting Bill has been among the most ambitious. It is
ambitious in terms of the geographical and population scope of its
impact. It is ambitious in its effort to unite so many areas of regu
lation of the electronic media. And it is ambitious in terms of its
effort to legitimate the growth of broadcasting while at the same
time being attentive to the special needs of Indian culture. Draw
ing on many other models, the Bill represents an attempt to ad
dress new technologies, harmonize these new technologies with
older ones, control the effect of new communications technologies
on national identity, culture, and religion, restrict foreign and do
mestic ownership patterns with respect to communications inter
ests, and maintain India's important thrust in encouraging
investment and expanding trade relations.

